Persuasion with communication costs (Q2516228): Difference between revisions

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+Cheap talk and burned money
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+Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
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+Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
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+Q5848416
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+Strategic Information Transmission
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+Strategic argumentation
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+Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission
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+Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
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+Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
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+Long persuasion games
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+The money-burning refinement: with an application to a political signalling game
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+Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
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+A note on cheap talk and burned money
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+Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
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+Credulity, lies, and costly talk
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+Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
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+Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
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+Refining cheap-talk equilibria
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+Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
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