Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes (Q898672): Difference between revisions

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+On probability models in voting theory
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+Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
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+New candidates welcome! Possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates
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+Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
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+Inverted orders for monotone scoring rules
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+The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution
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+Robustness of positional scoring over subsets of alternatives
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+Scoring rule and majority agreements for large electorates with arbitrary preferences
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+Optimal pairs of score vectors for positional scoring rules
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+Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes
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+New Results on Equilibria in Strategic Candidacy
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+The source of some paradoxes from social choice and probability
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+A dictionary for voting paradoxes
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+The Borda dictionary
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+The Copeland method. I: Relationships and the dictionary
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+Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
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+On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
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+Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
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+The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
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