Contracting with a naïve time-inconsistent agent: to exploit or not to exploit? (Q900252): Difference between revisions

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+Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence
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+Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
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+Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
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+Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting
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+The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem
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+Incentives for Procrastinators
@@ Property / cites work: Incentives for Procrastinators / rank @@
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+Choice and Procrastination
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+Repeated Moral Hazard
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+On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
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