Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions (Q3459303): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / cites work @@
+Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
@@ Property / cites work: Multi-unit auctions with budget limits / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The incompatibility of Pareto optimality and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in sufficiently-anonymous budget-constrained quasilinear settings
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Incentives in Teams
@@ Property / cites work: Incentives in Teams / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
@@ Property / cites work: Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
+Normal rank