A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser (Q274071): Difference between revisions

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+Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
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+Two Algorithms for Determining Volumes of Convex Polyhedra
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+Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules
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+On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives
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+Electoral systems. Paradoxes, assumptions, and procedures
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+Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates
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+The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
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+The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes
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+On the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
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+How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?
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+Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
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