A decomposition of strategy-proofness (Q331707): Difference between revisions

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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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+Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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+Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
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+Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
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+Q3993509
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+The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
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+Bounded response of aggregated preferences
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+Circular domains
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+A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
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+Bounded response and the equivalence of nonmanipulability and independence of irrelevant alternatives
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+Social Choice Scoring Functions
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