On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts (Q508382): Difference between revisions

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+Some further properties of the cumulative offer process
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+Characterizations of the cumulative offer process
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+Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
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+On the operation of multiple matching markets
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+Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
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+Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
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+Cumulative offer process is order-independent
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+School Choice with Consent<sup>*</sup>
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+Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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+A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts
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+Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result
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+Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
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+Matching With (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy
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