Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching (Q523004): Difference between revisions

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+The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings
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+The housing problem and revealed preference theory: duality and an application
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+Two new proofs of Afriat's theorem
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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+The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
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+Q3999327
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+The assignment game. I: The core
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