Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks (Q2628295): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / cites work @@
+Configuration values: Extensions of the coalitional Owen value
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Joint games and compatibility
@@ Property / cites work: Joint games and compatibility / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation
@@ Property / cites work: A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Cooperative Game Theory Foundations of Network Bargaining Games
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Cores of combined games
@@ Property / cites work: Cores of combined games / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A strategic model of social and economic networks
@@ Property / cites work: A strategic model of social and economic networks / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Firms and market equilibria in a private ownership economy
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Efficiency in coalition games with externalities
@@ Property / cites work: Efficiency in coalition games with externalities / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions
@@ Property / cites work: Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
@@ Property / cites work: A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Bargaining and Value
@@ Property / cites work: Bargaining and Value / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A simple noncooperative core story
@@ Property / cites work: A simple noncooperative core story / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Values of games in partition function form
@@ Property / cites work: Values of games in partition function form / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Conference structures and fair allocation rules
@@ Property / cites work: Conference structures and fair allocation rules / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A note on the core of TU-cooperative games with multiple membership externalities
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q5433153
@@ Property / cites work: Q5433153 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A theory of endogenous coalition structures
@@ Property / cites work: A theory of endogenous coalition structures / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
@@ Property / cites work: Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A market to implement the core
@@ Property / cites work: A market to implement the core / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Non-cooperative implementation of the core
@@ Property / cites work: Non-cooperative implementation of the core / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Stable coalition structures with externalities
@@ Property / cites work: Stable coalition structures with externalities / rank @@
+Normal rank