Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems (Q2398192): Difference between revisions

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+A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching
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+Q3066116
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+Core in a simple coalition formation game
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+Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
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+On the existence of stable roommate matchings
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+On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
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+Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+When do stable roommate matchings exist? A review
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
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+Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
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+Stable matchings and the small core in Nash equilibrium in the college admissions problem.
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+Q4902563
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+Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
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+Representing roommates' preferences with symmetric utilities
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+Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
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+Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
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+On cores and indivisibility
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+The assignment game. I: The core
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+Implementation in generalized matching problems
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+Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
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+Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
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+A characterization of ordinal potential games
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+A note on the strong core of a market with indivisible goods
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