Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints (Q1677256): Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 16:45, 14 July 2024

scientific article
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Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints
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    Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints (English)
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    10 November 2017
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    pairwise stability
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    budget constraint
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    path to stability
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