An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions (Q1682703): Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 19:27, 14 July 2024

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An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions
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    An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions (English)
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    5 December 2017
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    bounded response
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    strategy-proofness
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    non-manipulability
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    Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
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