Zero-determinant strategies in finitely repeated games (Q1752417): Difference between revisions

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+The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: Good Strategies and Their Dynamics
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+The Evolution of Cooperation
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+Equal Pay for All Prisoners
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+The robustness of zero-determinant strategies in iterated prisoner's dilemma games
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+Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games
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+Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma
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+Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games
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+Learning to cooperate with Pavlov and adaptive strategy for the iterated prisoner's dilemma with noise
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+Evolutionary behavior of generalized zero-determinant strategies in iterated prisoner's dilemma
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+Autocratic strategies for alternating games
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+Q5491046
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+Automata, repeated games and noise
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+Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
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+The Calculus of Selfishness
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+Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
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+From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
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