Optimal prize allocation in contests: the role of negative prizes (Q1753695): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 17:18, 15 July 2024

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Optimal prize allocation in contests: the role of negative prizes
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    Optimal prize allocation in contests: the role of negative prizes (English)
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    29 May 2018
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    optimal contest
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    mechanism design
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    negative prize
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    incomplete information
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    cross transfer
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    leverage
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