Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide (Q1650274): Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 01:23, 16 July 2024

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Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
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    Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide (English)
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    3 July 2018
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    mechanism design
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    preference
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    social choice
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