Risk externalities: when financial imperfections are not the problem, but part of the solution (Q1669112): Difference between revisions

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+Robustly Coalition-Proof Incentive Mechanisms for Public Good Provision are Voting Mechanisms and Vice Versa: TABLE 1
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+General equilibrium with endogenous securities and moral hazard
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+Generic regularity of competitive equilibria with restricted participation
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+Constrained suboptimality in incomplete markets: A general approach and two applications
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+Pareto improving taxes
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+Nash-Walras equilibria
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+Incentives in Teams
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+Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
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+On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget
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+Generic existence of competitive equilibria with restricted participation
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+The Inefficiency of the Stock Market Equilibrium
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