Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets (Q1668196): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / cites work @@
+Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
@@ Property / cites work: Endogenous budget constraints in auctions / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Optimal Auction Design
@@ Property / cites work: Optimal Auction Design / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Money in Search Equilibrium, in Competitive Equilibrium, and in Competitive Search Equilibrium
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical
+Normal rank