Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds (Q1786417): Difference between revisions

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+The Evolution of Cooperation
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+Know when to walk away: contingent movement and the evolution of cooperation
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+Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
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+Public goods games with reward in finite populations
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+The evolution of altruism: game theory in multilevel selection and inclusive fitness
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+Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
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+Replicator dynamics of reward \& reputation in public goods games
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+Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
@@ Property / cites work: Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics / rank @@
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+Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
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+Social control and the social contract: the emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action
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