Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof (Q1622367): Difference between revisions

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+Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
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+School choice: an experimental study
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+Economic efficiency requires interaction
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+Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
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+Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
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+A Stable Marriage Requires Communication
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+Q2921653
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+Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match
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+The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
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+The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets
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