Set-valued games and mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted supergames (Q1727718): Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 08:08, 18 July 2024

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Set-valued games and mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted supergames
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    Set-valued games and mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted supergames (English)
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    20 February 2019
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    repeated games
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    mixed strategy
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    subgame perfection
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    set-valued games
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    public correlation
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    orthogonal convexity
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