Folk theorems in a bargaining game with endogenous protocol (Q2424312): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 16:46, 19 July 2024

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Folk theorems in a bargaining game with endogenous protocol
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    Folk theorems in a bargaining game with endogenous protocol (English)
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    24 June 2019
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    bargaining
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    endogenous protocol
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    folk theorems
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