Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities (Q2334311): Difference between revisions

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+TWO-SIDED MATCHING WITH EXTERNALITIES: A SURVEY
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+Normal rank
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+Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
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+Normal rank
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+A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
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+Nash implementation of matching rules
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+Normal rank
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+Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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+Normal rank
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+Matching with Externalities
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+Normal rank
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+Q3999327
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+Normal rank
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+Two-sided matching problems with externalities
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+Normal rank
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+On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
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