Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size (Q2294116): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Set OpenAlex properties.
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: House allocation with existing tenants / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Core in a simple coalition formation game / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Generalized median voter schemes and committees / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The stability of hedonic coalition structures / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Coalition formation games with separable preferences. / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: An alternative characterization of the uniform rule / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Hedonic coalition formation games: a new stability notion / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for pure public goods economies when preferences are monotonic / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: One-dimensional mechanism design / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Unique stability in simple coalition formation games / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q5433153 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Strategy-proof coalition formation / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q4273943 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Kidney Exchange / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On myopic stability concepts for hedonic games / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Non-bossiness / rank
 
Normal rank

Revision as of 17:20, 21 July 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size
scientific article

    Statements

    Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    10 February 2020
    0 references
    group selection
    0 references
    group size
    0 references
    single-peaked preference
    0 references
    strategy-proofness
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references

    Identifiers