Promises and endogenous reneging costs (Q2173104): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 11:48, 22 July 2024

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Promises and endogenous reneging costs
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    Promises and endogenous reneging costs (English)
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    22 April 2020
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    promises
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    strategic complements
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    lying costs
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    input games
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    partnership games
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