Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: experiments (Q2178016): Difference between revisions

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+On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
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+Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
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+Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence
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+Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
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+A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
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+The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
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+The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
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+Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
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+Measuring the Incentive to Collude: The Vitamin Cartels, 1990–99
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+Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
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+Behavioral theory of repeated prisoner's dilemma: generous tit-for-tat strategy
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+The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
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+Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
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+Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
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