Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms (Q2178581): Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 15:07, 22 July 2024

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Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
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    Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms (English)
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    11 May 2020
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    cardinal mechanism design
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    ordinal mechanism design
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    incentive compatibility
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    strategic voting
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