Contribute once! Full efficiency in a dynamic contribution game (Q2206810): Difference between revisions

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+Joint Projects without Commitment
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+Voluntary contributions to a joint project with asymmetric agents.
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+Projects and Team Dynamics
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+Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
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+Achievable outcomes of dynamic contribution games
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+On the endogeneity of Cournot--Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: games of accumulation
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