Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer (Q2212767): Difference between revisions

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+Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
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+Monotonicity and Implementability
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+Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders
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+Q5417648
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+Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
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+Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
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+Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
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+The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
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+Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents
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+Q3651735
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+Normal rank
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+Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
@@ Property / cites work: Multi-unit auctions with budget limits / rank @@
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+A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints
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+Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
@@ Property / cites work: Characterization of Revenue Equivalence / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+First‐price auctions with budget constraints
@@ Property / cites work: First‐price auctions with budget constraints / rank @@
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+Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
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+Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem
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+Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders
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+Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
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+Optimal Auction Design
@@ Property / cites work: Optimal Auction Design / rank @@
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+Housing Market Dynamics: On the Contribution of Income Shocks and Credit Constraints*
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+Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
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+A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
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+Q3100563
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