A two-echelon agricultural product supply chain with freshness and greenness concerns: a cost-sharing contract perspective (Q2223241): Difference between revisions
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Property / cites work: A joint economic lot size model for a supplier-manufacturer-retailers supply chain of an agricultural product / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Decision-making of fresh agricultural product supply chain considering the manufacturer's fairness concerns / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Coordinating a three-echelon fresh agricultural products supply chain considering freshness-keeping effort with asymmetric information / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Social responsibility allocation in two-echelon supply chains: insights from wholesale price contracts / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 11:42, 24 July 2024
scientific article
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English | A two-echelon agricultural product supply chain with freshness and greenness concerns: a cost-sharing contract perspective |
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A two-echelon agricultural product supply chain with freshness and greenness concerns: a cost-sharing contract perspective (English)
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28 January 2021
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Summary: Agricultural products are basic needs of human beings, and whether they are cultivated in a green (or organic) manner has direct impact on environment and public health. This research incorporates product freshness and greenness into a two-echelon agricultural product supply chain (APSC). Game theoretic analyses are carried out to examine pricing, freshness, and greenness decisions of the supply chain members with and without cost-sharing for greenness investment. Subsequently, we conduct comparative and sensitivity analyses for these optimal decisions and profits of the APSC members under different cases. Numerical experiment is employed to investigate the impact of key parameters on equilibrium decisions and profitability. Analytical and experimental results show that the cost-sharing contract of greenness investment for agricultural products helps to strengthen the supply chain members' effort in improving the greenness and freshness levels of the agricultural product, thereby enhancing both individual and channel profitability of the APSC under certain conditions. This research also reveals a widened profit gap between the producer and the retailer under the cost-sharing contract.
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