Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments (Q1995479): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 16:40, 24 July 2024

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Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments
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    Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments (English)
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    23 February 2021
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    dynamic legislative bargaining
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    distributive politics
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    standing committees
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    endogenous status quo
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    veto power
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    Markov perfect equilibrium
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    laboratory experiments
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