Optimal selling mechanisms with buyer price search (Q2231387): Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 17:22, 26 July 2024

scientific article
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Optimal selling mechanisms with buyer price search
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    Optimal selling mechanisms with buyer price search (English)
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    29 September 2021
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    dynamic mechanism design
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    outside option
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    price search
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    price matching
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    search deterrence
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