On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms (Q2060531): Difference between revisions

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+Group robust stability in matching markets
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+When is the Boston mechanism strategy-proof?
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+Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: characterizations
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+Efficient assignment respecting priorities
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+Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
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+Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
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+Constrained school choice
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+Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
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+On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
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+Robust stability in matching markets
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+Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
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+On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
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