Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions (Q2067384): Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 17:41, 27 July 2024

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Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions
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    Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions (English)
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    18 January 2022
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    auctions
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    ambiguity
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    consistent planning
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