Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver (Q2074048): Difference between revisions

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+Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
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+Normal rank
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+Competitive disclosure of correlated information
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+Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
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+Ambiguous persuasion
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+Normal rank
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+Robust monopoly pricing
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+Normal rank
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+Q5807222
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+Normal rank
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+Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design
@@ Property / cites work: Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices
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+Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
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+Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
+Normal rank
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+Core and equilibria under ambiguity
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+Normal rank
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+Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
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+Normal rank
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+Implementation under ambiguity
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+Normal rank
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+Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation
@@ Property / cites work: Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Berk-Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents With Misspecified Models
+Normal rank
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+Equilibrium in misspecified Markov decision processes
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+Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
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+Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
+Normal rank
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+Competition in Persuasion
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+Normal rank
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+Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
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+Normal rank
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+The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure
@@ Property / cites work: The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure / rank @@
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+Q5509729
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+Normal rank
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+Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
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+Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
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+Normal rank
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+On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders
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+Normal rank
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+Mechanism design with maxmin agents: Theory and an application to bilateral trade
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