The Nash bargaining solution is optimal (Q1104875): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 11:32, 30 July 2024

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The Nash bargaining solution is optimal
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    The Nash bargaining solution is optimal (English)
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    1986
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    The author studies the classical two-person bargaining game. The set F consists of all bargaining solutions that satisfy the following known axioms: Pareto optimality, scale invariance, symmetry and risk sensitivity. It is proved that for any bargaining game S the set \(\{\) f(S): \(f\in S\}\) is closed and connected. A meta bargaining game \(\Gamma\) (S) is defined, where \(S_ 1=S\) and the set \(S_{t+1}\) consists of all those payoff vectors for which the ith coordinate does not exceed the demand of player i in stage t. This game has many interesting properties. It is also proved that only the Nash solution is an equilibrium for every bargaining game S, and that the ``independence of irrelevant alternative'' axiom can be replaced by a much weaker recursivity axiom.
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    two-person bargaining
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    Pareto optimality
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    scale invariance
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    symmetry
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    risk sensitivity
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    meta bargaining game
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    Nash solution
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