Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences (Q2092786): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 17:04, 30 July 2024

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Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences
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    Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences (English)
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    3 November 2022
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    group strategy-proofness
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    probabilistic rule
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    single-peaked preferences
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