Strategy-proof allocation with outside option (Q2681500): Difference between revisions

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+When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful?
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+Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
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+Pairwise Kidney Exchange over the Blood Group Barrier
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+A new solution to the random assignment problem.
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+The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
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+Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
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+Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities
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+Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
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+Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
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+Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
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+On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
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+Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem
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+School Choice with Consent<sup>*</sup>
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+Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
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+Strategy-proof and fair assignment is wasteful
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+Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
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+Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
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+Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
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+Pairwise kidney exchange
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+Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
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+On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
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