Multi-Item Nontruthful Auctions Achieve Good Revenue (Q5885584): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 21:30, 31 July 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7672196
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Multi-Item Nontruthful Auctions Achieve Good Revenue
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7672196

    Statements

    Multi-Item Nontruthful Auctions Achieve Good Revenue (English)
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    4 April 2023
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    multi-item auctions
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    nontruthful auctions
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    revenue approximation
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    entry fee mechanisms
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    mechanism design
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