Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences (Q6102576): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / cites work @@
+A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Matching with single-peaked preferences
@@ Property / cites work: Matching with single-peaked preferences / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
@@ Property / cites work: Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On cores and indivisibility
@@ Property / cites work: On cores and indivisibility / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
@@ Property / cites work: Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods / rank @@
+Normal rank