The limits of ex post implementation without transfers (Q6076897): Difference between revisions

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+Domains Admitting Ex Post IncentiveCompatible and Respectful Mechanisms: A Characterization for the Two-Alternative Case
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+Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
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+Robust Mechanism Design
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+Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
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+Efficient assignment with interdependent values
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+Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
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+Efficient Auctions
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+Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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+The Limits of ex post Implementation
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+Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
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+An Efficient Auction
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+The Marriage Problem with Interdependent Preferences
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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