Characterizing the TTC rule via pair-efficiency: a short proof (Q6117767): Difference between revisions

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+Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
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+Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
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+Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
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+Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
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+Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
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+Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
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+Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
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+Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
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+Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
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+An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
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+On cores and indivisibility
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