Condorcet jury theorem: an example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation (Q2343313): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 02:34, 18 December 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Condorcet jury theorem: an example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation |
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Condorcet jury theorem: an example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation (English)
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5 May 2015
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Condorcet jury theorem
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information aggregation
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large Poisson games
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