Resource allocation games: a compromise stable extension of bankruptcy games (Q376726): Difference between revisions
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Property / author: P. E. M. Borm / rank | |||
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This paper presents an extension of the traditional bankruptcy problem \((N,E,d)\) to the resource allocation problem \((N,E,d, \alpha)\), where \(N\) represents a finite set of claimants, \(E\geq 0\) is the estate which has to be divided among the claimants, \(d=(d_i)_{i\in N}\) is a vector in \(\mathbb R^N_{++}\) with \(d_i\) representing agent \(i\)'s claim on the estate (\(\sum_{i\in N}d_i\geq E\)), and \(\alpha=(\alpha_i)_{i\in N}\) is a vector in \(\mathbb R^N_{++}\) with \(\alpha_i\) describing agent \(i\)'s reward function \(r_i(x_i)=\alpha_ix_i\) (here \(x_i\geq 0\) is a feasible assignment part possible to be given to agent \(i\) restricted by: \(0\leq x_i\leq d_i\) and \(\sum_{i\in N}x_i=E\)). The problem is how to find the ``best'' feasible assignment vector \(x=(x_i)_{i\in N}\) among the optimal assignments, that is satisfying \(\sum_{i\in N}\alpha_ix_i =\max\). To solve this problem, the authors construct a TU-game \(v^R\) (called a resource allocation game) corresponding to the resource allocation problem \((N,E,d, \alpha)\). It is shown for the game \(v^R\) that it is compromise stable and totally balanced. Furthermore, an explicit expression for the nucleolus of the game \(v^R\) has been derived. | |||
Property / review text: This paper presents an extension of the traditional bankruptcy problem \((N,E,d)\) to the resource allocation problem \((N,E,d, \alpha)\), where \(N\) represents a finite set of claimants, \(E\geq 0\) is the estate which has to be divided among the claimants, \(d=(d_i)_{i\in N}\) is a vector in \(\mathbb R^N_{++}\) with \(d_i\) representing agent \(i\)'s claim on the estate (\(\sum_{i\in N}d_i\geq E\)), and \(\alpha=(\alpha_i)_{i\in N}\) is a vector in \(\mathbb R^N_{++}\) with \(\alpha_i\) describing agent \(i\)'s reward function \(r_i(x_i)=\alpha_ix_i\) (here \(x_i\geq 0\) is a feasible assignment part possible to be given to agent \(i\) restricted by: \(0\leq x_i\leq d_i\) and \(\sum_{i\in N}x_i=E\)). The problem is how to find the ``best'' feasible assignment vector \(x=(x_i)_{i\in N}\) among the optimal assignments, that is satisfying \(\sum_{i\in N}\alpha_ix_i =\max\). To solve this problem, the authors construct a TU-game \(v^R\) (called a resource allocation game) corresponding to the resource allocation problem \((N,E,d, \alpha)\). It is shown for the game \(v^R\) that it is compromise stable and totally balanced. Furthermore, an explicit expression for the nucleolus of the game \(v^R\) has been derived. / rank | |||
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Property / reviewed by: Tadeusz Radzik / rank | |||
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID | |||
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12 / rank | |||
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID | |||
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A06 / rank | |||
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID | |||
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32 / rank | |||
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Property / zbMATH DE Number | |||
Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6229221 / rank | |||
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Property / zbMATH Keywords | |||
bankruptcy games | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: bankruptcy games / rank | |||
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compromise stability | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: compromise stability / rank | |||
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nucleolus | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: nucleolus / rank | |||
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resource allocation games | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: resource allocation games / rank | |||
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Revision as of 11:45, 29 June 2023
scientific article
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English | Resource allocation games: a compromise stable extension of bankruptcy games |
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Statements
Resource allocation games: a compromise stable extension of bankruptcy games (English)
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19 November 2013
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This paper presents an extension of the traditional bankruptcy problem \((N,E,d)\) to the resource allocation problem \((N,E,d, \alpha)\), where \(N\) represents a finite set of claimants, \(E\geq 0\) is the estate which has to be divided among the claimants, \(d=(d_i)_{i\in N}\) is a vector in \(\mathbb R^N_{++}\) with \(d_i\) representing agent \(i\)'s claim on the estate (\(\sum_{i\in N}d_i\geq E\)), and \(\alpha=(\alpha_i)_{i\in N}\) is a vector in \(\mathbb R^N_{++}\) with \(\alpha_i\) describing agent \(i\)'s reward function \(r_i(x_i)=\alpha_ix_i\) (here \(x_i\geq 0\) is a feasible assignment part possible to be given to agent \(i\) restricted by: \(0\leq x_i\leq d_i\) and \(\sum_{i\in N}x_i=E\)). The problem is how to find the ``best'' feasible assignment vector \(x=(x_i)_{i\in N}\) among the optimal assignments, that is satisfying \(\sum_{i\in N}\alpha_ix_i =\max\). To solve this problem, the authors construct a TU-game \(v^R\) (called a resource allocation game) corresponding to the resource allocation problem \((N,E,d, \alpha)\). It is shown for the game \(v^R\) that it is compromise stable and totally balanced. Furthermore, an explicit expression for the nucleolus of the game \(v^R\) has been derived.
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bankruptcy games
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compromise stability
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nucleolus
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resource allocation games
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