Stackelberg solutions of feedback type for differential games with random initial data (Q384053): Difference between revisions
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In the space \(\mathbb{R}^n\) a differential game is investigated described by the differential equation \[ \dot{x}(t)=f(t,x(t),u_1(t),u_2(t)),\qquad u_1(t)\in U_1,u_2(t)\in U_2,t\geq 0, \] with the initial condition \[ x(0)=\hat{x}, \] where \(U_1,U_2\subseteq \mathbb{R}^{m}\) are given sets. The goal of the first \(u_1(\cdot)\) and second \(u_2(\cdot)\) player is to minimize his own cost given by \[ \int_{0}^{T}L_1(t,x(t),u_1(t),u_2(t))dt \] and \[ \int_{0}^{T}L_2(t,x(t),u_1(t),u_2(t))dt, \] respectively. In the paper it is assumed that the first player announces his feedback strategy (Stackelberg equilibrium) in advance i.e., \(u_1=u_1(t,x).\) The second player chooses his strategy \(u_2=u_2(t;u_1,\hat{x})\) in order to minimize his own cost. An existence theorem of an optimal feedback strategy under natural assumptions on the cost functions \(L_1\), \(L_2\) and necessary optimality conditions of such a feedback strategy are proved. | |||
Property / review text: In the space \(\mathbb{R}^n\) a differential game is investigated described by the differential equation \[ \dot{x}(t)=f(t,x(t),u_1(t),u_2(t)),\qquad u_1(t)\in U_1,u_2(t)\in U_2,t\geq 0, \] with the initial condition \[ x(0)=\hat{x}, \] where \(U_1,U_2\subseteq \mathbb{R}^{m}\) are given sets. The goal of the first \(u_1(\cdot)\) and second \(u_2(\cdot)\) player is to minimize his own cost given by \[ \int_{0}^{T}L_1(t,x(t),u_1(t),u_2(t))dt \] and \[ \int_{0}^{T}L_2(t,x(t),u_1(t),u_2(t))dt, \] respectively. In the paper it is assumed that the first player announces his feedback strategy (Stackelberg equilibrium) in advance i.e., \(u_1=u_1(t,x).\) The second player chooses his strategy \(u_2=u_2(t;u_1,\hat{x})\) in order to minimize his own cost. An existence theorem of an optimal feedback strategy under natural assumptions on the cost functions \(L_1\), \(L_2\) and necessary optimality conditions of such a feedback strategy are proved. / rank | |||
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Property / reviewed by | |||
Property / reviewed by: Tamaz Tadumadze / rank | |||
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID | |||
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A23 / rank | |||
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID | |||
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05 / rank | |||
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID | |||
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 49N70 / rank | |||
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Property / zbMATH DE Number | |||
Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6232410 / rank | |||
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Property / zbMATH Keywords | |||
differential game | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: differential game / rank | |||
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Property / zbMATH Keywords | |||
Stackelberg equilibrium solution | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: Stackelberg equilibrium solution / rank | |||
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Property / zbMATH Keywords | |||
closed loop strategy | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: closed loop strategy / rank | |||
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Revision as of 13:25, 29 June 2023
scientific article
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English | Stackelberg solutions of feedback type for differential games with random initial data |
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Stackelberg solutions of feedback type for differential games with random initial data (English)
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25 November 2013
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In the space \(\mathbb{R}^n\) a differential game is investigated described by the differential equation \[ \dot{x}(t)=f(t,x(t),u_1(t),u_2(t)),\qquad u_1(t)\in U_1,u_2(t)\in U_2,t\geq 0, \] with the initial condition \[ x(0)=\hat{x}, \] where \(U_1,U_2\subseteq \mathbb{R}^{m}\) are given sets. The goal of the first \(u_1(\cdot)\) and second \(u_2(\cdot)\) player is to minimize his own cost given by \[ \int_{0}^{T}L_1(t,x(t),u_1(t),u_2(t))dt \] and \[ \int_{0}^{T}L_2(t,x(t),u_1(t),u_2(t))dt, \] respectively. In the paper it is assumed that the first player announces his feedback strategy (Stackelberg equilibrium) in advance i.e., \(u_1=u_1(t,x).\) The second player chooses his strategy \(u_2=u_2(t;u_1,\hat{x})\) in order to minimize his own cost. An existence theorem of an optimal feedback strategy under natural assumptions on the cost functions \(L_1\), \(L_2\) and necessary optimality conditions of such a feedback strategy are proved.
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differential game
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Stackelberg equilibrium solution
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closed loop strategy
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