Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem (Q431230): Difference between revisions

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An axiomatic framework is provided to analyze the following problem. A waste disposal facility has to be sited in one of several districts producing different amounts of waste. The construction cost of the facility depends on where it is sited. When a district accepts the facility, it bears a disutility. The problem is to choose a siting district and to share the construction cost while considering fair compensation for the siting district. A fair pricing rule is one that selects a district so as to minimize the social loss, applies a negative price to waste according to the social loss involved, and provides full compensation to the siting district. It is shown that this rule is the unique rule that satisfies certain requirements of efficiency, fairness, and robustness regarding the strategic transfers of waste. The nearly robustness of this rule to the misrepresentation of disutility information is also established.
Property / review text: An axiomatic framework is provided to analyze the following problem. A waste disposal facility has to be sited in one of several districts producing different amounts of waste. The construction cost of the facility depends on where it is sited. When a district accepts the facility, it bears a disutility. The problem is to choose a siting district and to share the construction cost while considering fair compensation for the siting district. A fair pricing rule is one that selects a district so as to minimize the social loss, applies a negative price to waste according to the social loss involved, and provides full compensation to the siting district. It is shown that this rule is the unique rule that satisfies certain requirements of efficiency, fairness, and robustness regarding the strategic transfers of waste. The nearly robustness of this rule to the misrepresentation of disutility information is also established. / rank
 
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Property / reviewed by
 
Property / reviewed by: Giacomo Bonanno / rank
 
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID
 
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91C99 / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH DE Number
 
Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6050571 / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
NIMBY (not in my backyard)
Property / zbMATH Keywords: NIMBY (not in my backyard) / rank
 
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market design
Property / zbMATH Keywords: market design / rank
 
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nearly robustness to strategic manipulation
Property / zbMATH Keywords: nearly robustness to strategic manipulation / rank
 
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proportional rule
Property / zbMATH Keywords: proportional rule / rank
 
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manipulation game
Property / zbMATH Keywords: manipulation game / rank
 
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core
Property / zbMATH Keywords: core / rank
 
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Revision as of 23:55, 29 June 2023

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Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem
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    Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem (English)
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    26 June 2012
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    An axiomatic framework is provided to analyze the following problem. A waste disposal facility has to be sited in one of several districts producing different amounts of waste. The construction cost of the facility depends on where it is sited. When a district accepts the facility, it bears a disutility. The problem is to choose a siting district and to share the construction cost while considering fair compensation for the siting district. A fair pricing rule is one that selects a district so as to minimize the social loss, applies a negative price to waste according to the social loss involved, and provides full compensation to the siting district. It is shown that this rule is the unique rule that satisfies certain requirements of efficiency, fairness, and robustness regarding the strategic transfers of waste. The nearly robustness of this rule to the misrepresentation of disutility information is also established.
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    NIMBY (not in my backyard)
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    market design
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    nearly robustness to strategic manipulation
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    proportional rule
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    manipulation game
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    core
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