A novel elliptic curve scalar multiplication algorithm against power analysis (Q474700): Difference between revisions

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Summary: Nowadays, power analysis attacks are becoming more and more sophisticated. Through power analysis attacks, an attacker can obtain sensitive data stored in smart cards or other embedded devices more efficiently than with any other kind of physical attacks. Among power analysis, simple power analysis (SPA) is probably the most effective against elliptic curve cryptosystem, because an attacker can easily distinguish between point addition and point doubling in a single execution of scalar multiplication. To make elliptic curve scalar multiplication secure against SPA attacks, many methods have been proposed using special point representations. In this paper, a simple but efficient SPA-resistant multiscalar multiplication is proposed. The method is to convert the scalar into a nonadjacent form (NAF) representation at first and then constitute it in a new signed digit representation. This new representation is undertaken at a small precomputation cost, as each representation needs just one doubling and 1/2 additions for each bit. In addition, when combined with randomization techniques, the proposed method can also guard against differential power analysis (DPA) attack.
Property / review text: Summary: Nowadays, power analysis attacks are becoming more and more sophisticated. Through power analysis attacks, an attacker can obtain sensitive data stored in smart cards or other embedded devices more efficiently than with any other kind of physical attacks. Among power analysis, simple power analysis (SPA) is probably the most effective against elliptic curve cryptosystem, because an attacker can easily distinguish between point addition and point doubling in a single execution of scalar multiplication. To make elliptic curve scalar multiplication secure against SPA attacks, many methods have been proposed using special point representations. In this paper, a simple but efficient SPA-resistant multiscalar multiplication is proposed. The method is to convert the scalar into a nonadjacent form (NAF) representation at first and then constitute it in a new signed digit representation. This new representation is undertaken at a small precomputation cost, as each representation needs just one doubling and 1/2 additions for each bit. In addition, when combined with randomization techniques, the proposed method can also guard against differential power analysis (DPA) attack. / rank
 
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 94A60 / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6373196 / rank
 
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Revision as of 17:34, 30 June 2023

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A novel elliptic curve scalar multiplication algorithm against power analysis
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    A novel elliptic curve scalar multiplication algorithm against power analysis (English)
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    24 November 2014
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    Summary: Nowadays, power analysis attacks are becoming more and more sophisticated. Through power analysis attacks, an attacker can obtain sensitive data stored in smart cards or other embedded devices more efficiently than with any other kind of physical attacks. Among power analysis, simple power analysis (SPA) is probably the most effective against elliptic curve cryptosystem, because an attacker can easily distinguish between point addition and point doubling in a single execution of scalar multiplication. To make elliptic curve scalar multiplication secure against SPA attacks, many methods have been proposed using special point representations. In this paper, a simple but efficient SPA-resistant multiscalar multiplication is proposed. The method is to convert the scalar into a nonadjacent form (NAF) representation at first and then constitute it in a new signed digit representation. This new representation is undertaken at a small precomputation cost, as each representation needs just one doubling and 1/2 additions for each bit. In addition, when combined with randomization techniques, the proposed method can also guard against differential power analysis (DPA) attack.
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