Objectivity and proof in a classical Indian theory of number (Q1611234)

The author discusses several aspects of the theory of number within the analytical stream of Indian philosophy, i.e., in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣka school. The material is also used to give an account of patterns of theory change in Indian philosophy of mathematics. The theory of number under consideration ``is an account of the semantics and epistemology of contingent numerical quantities'' (p.\ 413). Numericals are treated as numerical predicates, numbers are properties of objects. Several problems and their solutions given by historical authors are discussed, among them the `number of qualities' problem: if numbers are qualities, do qualities have a number? This is a special case of the problem of self-inherence which occurs in speaking of the one number one. Another problem discussed is the problem of cross-categoricity: ``If we can speak about the number of things in any category, then in what category do we place numbers themselves?'' (p.\ 417). A solution of these problems could be seen in the rejection of the classical opinion that numbers were qualities as was done within the school by \textit{Bhāsarvaja} (c.\ 950). According to him number adjectives stand for relations of identity and difference. \textit{Praśastapāda}'s (c.\ 530) `eight moments' theory goes beyond the classical theory by giving ``a detailed description of the ontogenesis of numbers, and of the psychological process by which they come to be cognised'' (p.\ 421). Further topics discussed are the objectivity of numbers regarded as real objects including the epistemological question how to perceive numbers. One of the different conceptions supports the hypothesis that mathematical truths are known with the help of a special source of knowledge, called `inclusion' (p.\ 426). The meaning of indefinite number terms like `many' is discussed, just as the role of mathematical demonstration, the goal of which was ``to bring the readers to the point where they really understand how and why theorem or rule is correct'' (p.\ 433). The empirical grounding of the theory of number is most important. It leads to special patterns of theory change, provoked by a perceived explanatory failure in the older theory or ``by a perceived mismatch between the older theory of a concept and the actual use of that concept in a range of cases'' (p.\ 431). The search for inconsistencies or paradoxes did not drive the philosophical practice.