Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism (Q1423684)

The problem of reaching core outcomes through revelation matching mechanism for the arriage market , using a stable matching rule has been studied intensively during last decades. But the non-revelation mechanism is not studied so intensively. Here, a full extension of the serial dictatorship mechanism and so-called Alcade et al. mechanism [\textit{J. Alcalde, A. Romero-Medina}, ''Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problem''. Games Econ. Behavior, 31(2), 294-302 (2000; Zbl 1065.91544)] are provided. In the mechanism proposed the women,s strategies are chosen simultaneously at the beginning of the game and actual matching is then selected by the men sequentially. A new idea explored in the paper is that one can regard some non-revelation mechanisms as simple procedure that can work well: both sides of the market use simple strategies and the equilibrium outcomes are the stable matching under the true preferences.