The ultimate of chaos resulting from weighted voting systems (Q2266654)

Start with a set of \(N\geq 3\) candidates and define \(N-1\) nested sets of (two or more) candidates by iteratively dropping one candidate. It is shown that when these subsets are to be ranked by the same set of voters, the election results can be as random as desired. More precisely, arbitrarily select a ranking for each subset of candidates and choose a way to tally the ballots (i.e. choose the number of points to be assigned to the \(j\)th ranked candidate on a ballot). There exist choices of voters' rankings of the \(N\) candidates so that for each subset the same group's election result is the selected one. In another paper of the author [''The optimal ranking method is the Borda Count'', Northwestern Univ. Disc. Paper 638, Jan. 1985], this result is extended to all possible subsets of candidates. In a further paper [Advances in equilibrium theory, Proc. Conf., Indianapolis/USA 1984, Lect. Notes Econ. Math. Syst. 244, 1--24 (1985; Zbl 0561.90002) (see the preceding review)], the author shows how this result is related to chaos from dynamical systems and other paradoxes from probability and statistics.