Associated consistency and equal allocation of nonseparable costs (Q2502344)

The author considers a special one-point solution \(\Phi\) for the classical TU-games \((N,v)\) where \(N = \{1,2,\ldots , n\}\) is the grand coalition of the players and \(v:2^N \rightarrow \mathbb R\) with (\(v(\emptyset)=0\)) is a function describing the power (cost) of each coalition \(S\subset N\). The solution \(\Phi(N,v) = \{\Phi_i(N,v)\}_{i\in \mathbb N}\) is required to satisfy five axioms. The first four axioms, Pareto Optimality (Efficiency), Symmetry, Translation Covariance and Continuity, are standard. The fifth axiom called Associated Consistency says the following: For all games \((N,v)\), \(\Phi(N,v) = \Phi(N,v^*_\lambda)\), where \((N,v^*_\lambda)\) is the associated game to \((N,v)\) defined by the formula, \(v^*_\lambda(S) = v(S) + \lambda\sum_{j\in \mathbb N\setminus S} \{v(S\cup j)-v(S) - [v(N)-v(N\setminus j)]\}\) for \(\emptyset \not= S\subset N\), where \(\lambda\) is a real coefficient. It is shown in the main result of the paper that for \(0<\lambda<\frac{2}{n-1}\) there exists the unique solution \(\{\Phi_i(N,v)\}_{i\in \mathbb N}\) (called equal allocation of nonseparable costs) of the form: \(\Phi_i(N,v) = v(N) - v(N\setminus i) + \frac{1}{n}\{v(N) - \sum_{k\in \mathbb N}[v(N)-v(N\setminus k)]\}\) for \(i\in \mathbb N\). To get this result the author has slightly modified the idea of the ''associated game'' recently introduced by Hamiache.